School accountability and teacher mobility by Li Feng et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES










We are grateful to the U.S. Department of Education, National Science Foundation and National Institutes
of Child Health and Human Development for research support, and to the Florida Department of Education
for providing the data for this analysis.  Seminar participants at Northwestern, Oregon, Wisconsin,
and the Swedish Research Institute for Industrial Economics, as well as conference participants at
the American Education Finance Association, Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management,
Society for Research on Educational Effectiveness, and Southern Economic Association meetings,
for helpful comments.  We alone are responsible for any errors in analysis or interpretation.  The results
reported herein do not necessarily reflect the views of the Florida Department of Education, or our
funders, or the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2010 by Li Feng, David N. Figlio, and Tim Sass. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not
to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including
© notice, is given to the source.School accountability and teacher mobility
Li Feng, David N. Figlio, and Tim Sass




This paper presents the first causal evidence on the effects of school accountability systems on teacher
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the universe of Florida public school teachers, we find strong evidence that accountability shocks influence
the teacher labor market; specifically, teachers are more likely to leave schools that have been downward
shocked -- especially to the bottom grade -- and they are less likely to leave schools that have been
upward shocked.  We also find that accountability shocks influence the distribution of the measured
quality of teachers (in terms of value added measures) who stay and leave their school, though the
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I.         Introduction 
School accountability -- the process of evaluating schools on the basis of the performance 
of their students and holding them responsible for this performance -- is becoming increasingly 
prevalent around the world.  Accountability systems are intended to solve the principal-agent 
problem in education, and the incentives that they provide to educators to improve student 
efficiency take several forms.  These systems provide direct incentives, in the form of explicit 
rewards or sanctions associated with good or poor performance.  In addition, many of the 
mechanisms for improvement involve social pressure, since a school’s constituents have both 
educational and financial reasons to influence low-performing schools to improve.  The financial 
reasons derive from the fact that school accountability ratings tend to be capitalized into housing 
values (Figlio and Lucas, 2004).  In addition, school accountability affects a school's ability to 
raise voluntary contributions (Figlio and Kenny, 2009).  This paper makes use of detailed data at 
the individual teacher level to gauge the degree to which teachers respond to these direct and 
indirect forms of accountability pressure by leaving the high-pressure school. 
There is certainly reason to believe that educators respond to accountability pressure in 
the ways in which they carry out their jobs.  Early evidence concerning the effects of these 
accountability systems on student performance indicates they tend to improve the outcomes of 
low-performing students (see, e.g., Chakrabarti, 2006; Chiang, 2009; Figlio and Rouse, 2006; 
Jacob, 2005; Rouse et al., 2007; West and Peterson, 2006).
1 However, Krieg (2008), Neal and 
Schanzenbach (2008) and Reback (2008) argue that the benefits of accountability pressures are 
concentrated in the more marginal students rather than the students whose performance would be 
                                                 
1 Recent nationwide studies by Carnoy and Loeb (2002) and Hanushek and Raymond (2005) also 
find significant improvement in student outcomes as a result of standards-based accountability, 
whereas the results from some specific state systems have been less positive (see, e.g, Koretz and 





far above or far below the performance thresholds set for the purposes of school accountability.  
That said, the weight of the evidence suggests that accountability systems have led schools to 
become more productive, at least along some measurable dimensions.  Rouse et al. (2007) 
document a number of the ways in which accountability pressure has changed school 
instructional policies and practices in Florida’s low-performing schools, and relate these 
instructional policy and practice changes to increased student performance.   
In addition to actively changing policies and practices to improve student outcomes, 
schools have also responded to accountability pressures by engaging in apparently strategic 
behavior with questionable educational benefit.  For instance, some schools have responded by 
differentially reclassifying low-achieving students as learning disabled so that their scores will 
not count against the school in accountability systems (see, e.g., Cullen and Reback, 2007; Figlio 
and Getzler, 2007; Jacob, 2005).
2  Figlio and Winicki (2005) suggest that Virginia schools facing 
accountability pressures altered their school nutrition programs on testing days to increase the 
likelihood that students will do well on the exams, and Figlio (2006) indicates that schools 
differentially suspend students at different points in the testing cycle in an apparent attempt to 
alter the composition of the testing pool.  Jacob and Levitt (2003) find that teachers are more 
likely to cheat when faced with more accountability pressure.  And the distributional effects 
documented by Neal and Schanzenbach (2008) and others are also evidence of strategic behavior 
on the part of schools.  In sum, school accountability systems cause schools to behave 
differently, and school personnel almost certainly are very responsive to increased accountability 
pressure. 
                                                 





Of course, the individuals implementing the changes in instructional policies and 
practices are teachers, and school accountability therefore has the potential to influence the 
desirability of certain teaching jobs.  Likewise, accountability may influence the willingness of 
schools to retain certain teachers.   From a theoretical perspective, the effects of accountability 
pressures on the teacher labor market are ambiguous.  On the demand side, in order to avoid 
sanctions and/or the stigma associated with being designated as a “failing” school, schools could 
increase their efforts to identify low performing teachers and remove them from their 
classrooms.  In this case, it is difficult to call these personnel changes a “job choice,” at least 
from the perspective of the teacher.  On the supply side, accountability pressure and associated 
changes in school policies could lower the net benefit of teaching in a school by reducing teacher 
discretion over curriculum or teaching methods.  Likewise, the potential stigma from teaching in 
a “failing” school could lead some teachers to seek employment at other schools.  On the other 
hand, the resources that often accompany sanctions (e.g. reading coaches, training for teachers, 
etc.) could reduce the non-monetary costs associated with working in low-performing schools 
and actually increase teacher retention.   
Similar patterns could be possible in the case of schools receiving high accountability 
marks.  Schools that perform well under accountability systems face the pressure to maintain 
their high scores or to improve upon them.  In Florida, for instance, schools receive extra bonus 
money for maintaining a top accountability score or for improving from one year to the next.  
Given that the housing market capitalization effects of school accountability are strongest in 
more affluent school areas (Figlio and Lucas, 2004), coupled with the fact that measurement 
error in test scores introduces a significant degree of randomness into the school accountability 





schools may face as much or more real accountability pressure as do low-performing schools.  
Goldhaber and Hannaway (2004), in a case study of schools in Florida, find that teacher and 
administrator anxiety levels due to school accountability were highest in the high-performing 
schools, where school personnel felt the most pressure to maintain their accountability marks.   
Hence, while teaching in a highly-rated school has its advantages, the extra accountability 
pressure may deter teachers as well. And, just as with the low-rated schools, highly-rated schools 
may engage in more teacher selection as a consequence of accountability.  Therefore, the 
theoretical expectations of how accountability pressures influence teacher job choice/placement 
are ambiguous for both highly-rated and low-rated schools. 
A number of recent papers have analyzed the determinants of teacher mobility and 
attrition (Boyd et al., 2005a, 2006, 2007; Clotfelter et al., forthcoming; Feng, 2009; Hanushek et 
al., 2004; Imazeki, 2004; Krieg, 2006; Podgursky et al., 2004; Scafidi et al. 2007).  However, the 
literature relating accountability pressures to teachers’ labor market decisions has been much 
spottier.  Boyd et al. (2005) explore the responses of teachers to the introduction of mandated 
state testing in New York State.  They find that teacher turnover in fourth grade, the critical 
accountability year in New York, decreased following the introduction of testing, and that 
entrants into fourth grade were more likely to be experienced than had previously been the case.  
Clotfelter et al. (2004) evaluate how North Carolina’s accountability system has influenced the 
ability of schools serving low-performing students to attract and retain high-quality teachers.  
They find that the introduction of the accountability system has exacerbated teacher turnover in 
these schools, though it is less evident that accountability has led to lower qualifications of the 





accountability systems in their states, but because they evaluate accountability systems that 
affected all schools within a state, it is difficult to derive causal inference from their analyses. 
In this paper, we exploit a major rule change in Florida’s school accountability system 
that took place in the summer of 2002 to identify the effects of changing school accountability 
pressures on teacher job changes.  Florida had graded every school in the state on a scale from 
“A” to “F” since the summer of 1999, based on proficiency rates in reading, writing and 
mathematics.  In 2002, the state dramatically changed its grading system to both recalibrate the 
acceptable student proficiency levels for the purposes of school accountability and to introduce 
student-level changes as an important determinant of school grades.  Using student-level micro-
data to calculate the school grades that would have occurred absent this change, we demonstrate 
that over half of all schools in the state experienced an accountability “shock” due to this grading 
change, with some schools receiving a higher grade than they would have otherwise received and 
other schools receiving a lower grade than would have otherwise occurred.  Furthermore, some 
schools were shocked downward to receive a grade of “F”, which no school in the state had 
received in the prior year of grading.  These grading shocks provide the vehicle for identification 
of accountability effects in this paper. 
We apply these accountability shocks to data on the universe of public school teachers in 
Florida.  We measure the effects of accountability pressures on teachers’ decisions to stay at a 
given school, move to another school in the same district, move to another school district in the 
state or leave public school teaching.  Since Florida has had statewide achievement testing in all 
grades 3-10 since 1999/2000 we are also able to compute “value-added” measures of teacher 
quality and determine whether teacher mobility engendered by accountability pressures tends to 





influence the teacher labor market; specifically, teachers are more likely to leave schools that 
have been downward shocked -- especially to the bottom grade -- and they are less likely to leave 
schools that have been upward shocked.  We also find that accountability shocks influence the 
distribution of the measured quality of teachers (in terms of value added measures) who stay and 
leave their school, though the average differences are not large.    The results, therefore, suggest 
that school accountability can have quite consequential effects for professional educators. 
 
II.  The Florida School Accountability Program  
  Education reform, and specifically a system of school accountability with a series of 
rewards and sanctions for high-performing and low-performing schools, was the policy 
centerpiece of Jeb Bush’s 1998 gubernatorial campaign in Florida; the resulting A+ Plan for 
Education was Bush’s first legislative initiative upon entering office in 1999.  The A+ Plan 
called for annual curriculum-based testing of all students in grades three through ten, and annual 
grading of all traditional public and charter schools based on aggregate test performance.  As 
noted above, the Florida accountability system assigns letter grades (“A,” “B,” etc.) to each 
school based on students’ achievement (measured in several ways).  High-performing and 
improving schools receive rewards while low-performing schools receive sanctions as well as 
additional assistance, through Florida’s Assistance Plus program.  The most famous and 
publicized provision of the A+ Plan was the institution of school vouchers, called “Opportunity 
Scholarships,” for students attending (or slated to attend) chronically failing schools – those 
receiving a grade of “F” in two years out of four, including the most recent year.  Opportunity 





  School grading began in May 1999, immediately following passage into law of the A+ 
Plan.  In each year from 1999 through 2001, a school would earn a grade of “F” if fewer than 60 
percent of students scored at level 2 (out of 5) or above in reading, fewer than 60 percent of 
students scored at level 2 (out of 5) or above in mathematics, and fewer than 50 percent of 
students scored at level 3 (out of 6) or above on the Florida Writes! writing evaluation, known 
from 2001 onward as the FCAT Writing examination.  A school could avoid the “F” label by 
meeting any one of these three standards in 1999; the same was true in 2000 and 2001 provided 
that at least 90 percent of the test-eligible students took the examination (or that the school could 
provide the state with a “reasonable explanation” for why fewer than 90 percent of students took 
the test.)  All schools in the distribution were subject to accountability pressure, and according to 
Goldhaber and Hannaway (2004), schools throughout the distribution apparently felt pressure to 
perform in measurable ways. 
Thus, between 1999 and the summer of 2001, schools were assessed primarily on the 
basis of aggregate test score levels (and also some additional non-test factors, such as attendance 
and suspension rates, for the higher grade levels) and only in the grades with existing statewide 
curriculum-based assessments,
3 rather than on progress schools make toward higher levels of 
student achievement.  Starting in summer 2002, however, school grades began to incorporate test 
score data from all grades from three through ten, and were also the first to evaluate schools not 
just on the level of student test performance but also on the year-to-year progress of individual 
students.  In our analysis, we take advantage of the fact that during the 2001-02 school year 
teachers would not have been able to anticipate their school grade in summer 2002 because of 
the changes in the formula and because the changes were not decided until the last minute.   
                                                 
3  Students were tested in grade 4 in reading and writing, in grade 5 in mathematics, in grade 8 in 





By the beginning of the 2001-02 school year several things were known about the school 
grades that were to be assigned in summer 2002.  First, the school grades were to have been 
based on the test scores of all students in grades three through ten in reading and mathematics, 
and in the fourth, eighth and tenth grades in writing.  Second, the standards for acceptable 
performance by students were to be raised from level 2 to level 3 in reading and mathematics.  
Third, some notion of a “value-added” system was to be established, though little was known 
about the specific nature of this system except that it would augment the levels-based grading 
system and would focus principally on the lowest-performing students.  These elements would 
be combined to give each school a total number of “grade” points.  The school’s grade would be 
determined by the number of points.  However, the specifics of the formula that would put these 
components together to form the school grades were not announced until March 5, 2002, leaving 
teachers entering the 2001-02 school year with virtually no information with which to anticipate 
their school’s exact grade.
 
  Table 1 shows the distribution of schools across the five performance grades for the first 
six rounds of school grading, for all graded schools in Florida.  As is apparent from the variation 
across years in the number of schools that fall into each performance category, there are 
considerable grade changes that have taken place since the accountability system was adopted.  
Most notable is the fact that while 70 schools received an F grade in the first year (1998-99) only 
4 did so the subsequent year and none did by the summer of 2001.  At the same time, an 
increasing number of schools were receiving A’s and B’s.  This is partly due to the fact that 
schools had learned their way around the system:  A school had to fail to meet proficiency 
targets in all three subjects to earn an F grade so as long as students did well enough in at least 





Chakrabarti (2006) find evidence that students in failing schools made the biggest gains in 
writing which is viewed as one of the easier subjects in which to improve quickly.  When the 
rules of the game changed, so did the number of schools caught by surprise:  For instance, 60 
schools earned an "F" grade in the summer of 2002.  The number of schools that received an A 
grade also increased, due in large measure to the shift to the “grade points” system of school 
grading, which allows schools that miss performance goals in one area to compensate with 
higher performance in another area.  Finally, note that as schools have adapted to the new 
grading system, the number of failing schools has decreased.
 4 
In this paper, we seek to exploit the degree to which schools and teachers were 
“surprised” by the change in school grading.  Using an approach to identification introduced by 
Rouse et al. (2007), we measure the “accountability shock” to schools and teachers by comparing 
the grades that schools actually received in the summer of 2002 with the grade that they would 
have been predicted to receive in 2002 based on the “old” grading system (that in place in 2001).  
We have programmed both the old and new accountability formulas and, using the full set of 
student administrative test scores provided us by the Florida Department of Education, we have 
calculated both the actual school grade that schools received in 2002 with the grade that they 
would have received given their realized student test scores had the grading system remained 
unchanged.  It is essential that we make this specific comparison, rather than simply comparing 
year-to-year changes in school grades, because year-to-year changes in school grades could 
                                                 
4 Note that in Table 1 there are 68 elementary schools that received a grade of “N” in 2002.  
These were new schools in that year.  As such, they were not given a formal grade although the 
state did calculate their accountability points.  Rouse et al. (2007) experimented with imputing 
what their grades would have been, and found that there would have been an additional 9 "F" 
graded schools and 10 additional "D" graded schools, for instance, had the state graded these 
schools in 2002.  Rouse et al. (2007) found that their results regarding test scores were 
completely insensitive to the treatment of these schools.  For the purposes of the present analysis, 





reflect not just accountability shocks, but also changes in student demographics, changes in 
school policies and practices, changes in school staffing, and other changes in school quality.  
Given that understanding school staffing is the point of this paper, it is clearly inappropriate to 
compare grade changes per se.    
Table 2 compares realized school grades to predicted school grades (based on the old 
grading system but the new student test scores) for the set of schools in the state of Florida.
5  We 
demonstrate that 51 percent of schools experienced a change in their school grade based on the 
changing parameters of the grading system itself.  Most of these schools (42 percent) 
experienced an upward shock in their school grades, while 9 percent of all schools experienced a 
downward shock in their school grades, receiving a lower grade than they would have expected 
had the grading system remained unchanged.  Twenty percent of schools that might have 
expected to receive a “D” under the old system received an “F” under the new one, while 38 
percent of these schools received a grade of “C” or better.  Meanwhile, 59 percent of schools that 
might have expected to receive a “B” under the old system received an “A” under the new one, 
while 9 percent of these schools received a grade of “C” or worse.  It is clear that the grading 
system change led to major changes in the accountability environment, and provides fertile 
ground for identification.   
 
                                                 
5  The number of observations in Table 2 does not exactly match that in Table 1 because we rely 
on administrative data on students provided by the Florida Department of Education to simulate 
each school’s grade in 2002.  This administrative dataset does not include some students in 
charter schools, “alternative” schools, and, of course, schools that do not have any students in the 





III. Data and Empirical Approach 
We are interested in modeling the effects of school accountability shocks on teacher 
mobility.  The most natural way to estimate this relationship is to consider year-to-year changes 
in teacher employment at a school.  In this paper, we estimated log-odds ratios generated from 
logit models in which the dependent variable is the likelihood that a teacher in year t leaves his 
or her school before year t+1, and our key independent variables are indicators for whether the 
school was upward or downward shocked in the 2002 school grading regime -- a change in 
accountability pressure that is exogenous to the school and its teachers.  As we observe teacher 
mobility decisions in the years before and after the school grading change, we can estimate 
difference-in-difference models in which we condition on school and time effects.  Our models 
are estimated at the individual teacher level, but since our treatment is a school-level treatment, 
all standard errors are clustered at the school level.  We report the results of models both 
including and excluding school and student body characteristics.   
The primary source of our data is the Florida Department of Education's K-20 Education 
Data Warehouse (FL-EDW), an integrated longitudinal database covering all Florida public 
school students and school employees from pre-school through college.  Like statewide 
administrative databases in North Carolina and Texas, the FL-EDW contains a rich set of 
information on both individual students and their teachers which is linked through time.  Unlike 
other statewide databases, however, the FL-EDW links both students and teachers to specific 
classrooms at all grade levels.   
Statewide data, as opposed to data from an individual school district, are particularly 
useful for studying teacher labor markets since we can follow teachers who move from one 





state.  Due to population growth and a constitutionally mandated maximum class size, Florida is 
a net importer of teachers.  Thus, unlike many Northern states where the school-age population is 
shrinking, there is relatively little outflow of teachers from Florida during the period under 
study.
6 Using national data from the Schools and Staffing Survey and associated Teacher 
Follow-Up Survey (SASS/TFS) which track teachers across state lines, Feng (2010) finds that 
there are relatively fewer teachers moving into or out of state of Florida compared to other 
Southern states, such as North Carolina and Georgia.  
The FL-EDW contains teachers’ data from the 1995/96 school year to the 2004/05 school 
year, though our primary analyses are based on data through 2002/03, the first year following the 
school accountability shock. Teachers’ school affiliation and status can be identified for the 
universe of all classroom teachers. In some of our specifications we condition on student test 
performance (or measure teachers' value added based on student performance); student test score 
records for all grades 3-10 are only available from the 1999/2000 school year forward.  We also, 
in some specifications, we control for average test scores, disciplinary incidents and socio-
economic status and demographics of the students in a teacher's school and district in an attempt 
to control for other factors  that might affect teacher mobility. 
 
IV. Accountability Shocks and Teacher Mobility 
We begin by investigating the number of relevant teachers who faced different 
accountability conditions during the accountability shock of summer 2002.  Table 3 presents a 
descriptive summary of teacher job change before and after the accountability shock, broken 
                                                 
6 With the recent sub-prime mortgage crisis after 2008, one might expect more of a teacher 





down by the type of shock a school received.
7  Independent of the type of accountability shock, 
teacher mobility was increasing over the time period.  This general increase in teacher job 
change could be due to the general expansion in the number of teachers employed; relatively 
inexperienced teachers tend to be more mobile than veteran teachers.  Prior to the accountability 
shock, downward shocked schools have the highest teacher departure rate (18.2 percent), with 
slightly lower rates in no-shock schools (16.6 percent) and upward shocked schools (15.9 
percent). There is little difference in the inter-temporal change in teacher job change between 
upward-shock and no-shock schools.  The fraction of teachers leaving non-shock schools was 1.0 
percentage points higher in the post-accountability-shock period and for upward-shock schools it 
was 0.7 percentage points higher.  However, there is a relatively large and statistically significant 
difference in the change in teacher departures between no-shock and downward-shock schools. 
Teacher job change increased by 2.8 percentage points in schools that received lower grades 
under the new accountability regime, whereas schools that did not experience a change in their 
grade as a result of the change in the accountability system had only one percentage point 
increase in teacher mobility.  This 1.8 percentage point difference in the rate of teacher departure 
is statistically significant at better than a 99.9 percent confidence level. 
The simple descriptive evidence suggests that schools experiencing downward shocks see 
more of their teachers depart after the implementation of the accountability formula change than 
do schools that did not experience an accountability shock.  In contrast, there is no significant 
difference in teacher departure from schools that receive higher grades under the new 
                                                 
7 Since 2002 school grades were announced in mid-June 2002, too late for most teachers to make 
a job change before the start of school in August, we define the pre-shock period as job changes 
that occurred between the three school-year pairs, 1999/00-2000/01, 2000/01-2001/02 and 
2001/02-2002/03.  The post-shock period is the transition between school years 2002/03 and 





accountability system relative to schools that experience no change in their grade as a result of 
the change in the accountability formula.  It is possible that any improvement in teachers’ 
perceptions of their work environment engendered by an unexpected increase in the school grade 
is offset by increased pressure to maintain a higher grade.  Of course these descriptive results do 
not directly account for other time-varying factors that may influence teacher mobility and which 
could be correlated with the type of shock a school receives.  Further, the descriptive 
comparisons are based on teacher job changes occurring between the pair of school years 
following the accountability shock (ie. differences between the 2002/03 and 2003/04 school 
years).  If teacher job changes occur over a longer time frame, our results may underestimate the 
behavioral response to an accountability shock.   
To account for other time varying factors that may affect teacher mobility, we first 
estimate logit models of the likelihood of leaving the current school, conditional on the 
characteristics of the teacher's current school.  Results are presented in Table 4. For ease of 
interpretation, the table reports the parameters in terms of the odds ratio, relative to the reference 
group of teachers (those whose schools did not face an accountability shock.)  An odds ratio of 
one indicates that a teacher whose school is shocked has equal odds of leaving the school as a 
teacher whose school is not shocked.  An odds ratio of less than one implies that the odds of 
leaving for a teacher whose school is shocked is lower than for the reference group of teachers. 
Our key variable of interest is the accountability shock faced by the cohort of teachers.  Because 
we observe multiple cohorts of teachers from schools, before versus after the accountability 
shock, we report differences-in-differences estimates in which we compare, say, teachers' 





shock to those from schools that are un-shocked.   All standard errors are adjusted for clustering 
at the school year level. 
The first column of Table 4 presents the key parameter estimates of this model,
8 in a 
specification that includes no covariates except for year indicators, a post-shock indicator, and 
shock-type fixed effects for upward and downward shocked schools. Similar to the descriptive 
statistics reported above, we find that teachers who are teaching in schools with an unexpected 
increase in accountability pressure (downward accountability shock) are about 11 percent more 
likely to leave their schools, and those with an unexpected decrease in accountability pressure 
(upward accountability shock) are  2.3 percent less likely to leave their schools, than are teachers 
facing no accountability shock.  These estimated effects are statistically distinct from one another 
and the downward-shocked estimate is statistically different from the no-shock status at a 90 
percent confidence level. Therefore, this simplest specification provides some initial evidence 
that teachers may respond to the information conveyed by accountability shocks.   
The remaining columns of Table 4 include increasing numbers of control variables. The 
second column controls for time-varying district-level demographics and FCAT math score level 
variables, and the third column controls for both district-level and school-level time-varying 
demographic variables. These include disciplinary incidents, percent of minority students (Black, 
Hispanic) and percent of students receiving subsidized lunches, in addition to time effects and 
shock-level fixed effects.
9  The fourth column further controls for school-level FCAT math score 
levels, and the fifth column controls for both school-level FCAT math score levels as well as 
math score gains. The point estimates are essentially constant across specifications, with the 
                                                 
8 For the sake of presentation parsimony we report only estimates of the key parameters of 
interest, but all coefficient estimates are available on request from the authors.   
9 Because we are conceiving of the accountability shock as a school-level treatment, we do not 





precision of the shock effect estimates generally increasing with the number of controls in the 
model.  Given the stability of our findings across model specifications, we focus on the fully 
specified model -- the model that controls for school and district student characteristics and 
school-level test score levels and gains (model 5) in the tables that follow. The descriptive results 
and parsimonious model 1 results are both supported by our preferred specification, model 5. 
Teachers teaching in downward shocked schools are 11 percent more likely to leave their schools 
compared to teachers in no-shock schools post reform. Differences between upward shocked 
schools and no-shock schools are not statistically significant throughout various specifications, 
suggesting teachers in these schools are just as likely to leave their schools as their counterparts 
in no-shock schools.   
In the last two columns of Table 4 we report two conditional logit specifications. The first 
conditional logit model is similar to logit model 5 with the exception that shock-level indicators 
are now replaced by school fixed effects to better control for time-invariant school factors that 
may affect teacher mobility. Schools and teachers may react differentially to upward and 
downward accountability shocks that lead to different school grades.  Figlio et al. (2007), for 
instance, find that test scores for "F" graded schools change more than test scores for other 
downward-shocked schools following the accountability policy change, and test scores decrease 
in "A" graded schools relative to those in other upward-shocked schools. We are interested in 
finding out whether teachers respond differently to being accountability-shocked to different 
portions of the grading distribution as well. The final column of Table 4, therefore, presents an 
augmented version of our most preferred specification broken out to reveal differences in 





Estimates in the final column of Table 4 show that teachers do indeed respond differently 
when shocked to different portions of the school grading distribution.  Teachers in schools whose 
school grade unexpectedly falls to a "B", "C" or "D" are no more likely to leave their school than 
are teachers in schools that did not experience a change in grade due to the new accountability 
system.  However, teachers in schools that experienced an unexpected drop into the failing 
category are 42 percent more likely to leave their school than are teachers in schools that did not 
experience an accountability shock. Once the difference between downward shock to "F" and 
downward shocks to higher grades are taken into account, teachers in schools that were upward 
shocked are found to be 6.5 percent less likely to leave their schools than teachers in no-shocked 
schools. However, the impact on teacher job change from being upwardly shocked to a school 
grade of “A” is not statistically different from that resulting from being upwardly shocked to a 
“B” or “C” (there were no “F” schools in the pre-shock year).
10  Hence, it appears that teachers 
who receive unexpected good news about the rating of their school are moderately more likely to 
stay in their current school whereas teachers are much more likely to depart their school if it is 
unexpectedly hit with a failing grade. 
Prior research on general teacher mobility distinguishes between moves between schools 
within a district, moves between districts and exit from public school teaching and finds that 
different factors can affect the type of move (c.f. Hanushek et al., 2004; Boyd, et al., 2005a; 
Scafidi, et al., 2007; Feng, 2009). These studies show that working conditions have a large 
impact on teacher mobility within a district, but inter-district moves and exits are more likely to 
                                                 
10 The coefficient of the differential effect of upward shock to "A" versus upward shock in 
general is actually positive, though statistically insignificant.  While the sign of this differential 
relationship may seem surprising, it is consistent with the qualitative findings of Goldhaber and 
Hannaway (2004) that suggest that educators in "A" schools felt more under pressure to maintain 





be affected by factors other than working conditions, such as salary differentials and geographic 
preferences. The accountability pressure under study here can be considered as a characteristic of 
teachers’ working conditions and thus we would expect there be differential effects of 
accountability pressure on the type of move.  In particular, we would expect accountability 
pressure to have a greater effect on within district moves and exits than on cross-district job 
changes. 
In Table 5 we present a set of conditional logit models by three possible transition 
destinations:  intra-district move, inter-district move, and exit Florida public school teaching.  
The results are consistent with our general findings on the effect of accountability on teacher job 
change as well as the evidence in the general teacher mobility literature on the differential effects 
of working conditions on alternative types of teacher transitions.  Schools shocked downward to 
"F" grades tend to lose teachers to other schools in the same district. Specifically teachers in 
these schools are nearly 67 percent more likely to move to a new school within the same district 
than are teachers in schools that experienced no accountability shock. Not surprisingly, 
movement of teachers between Florida’s countywide school districts is not significantly affected 
by downward accountability shocks, including receipt of an “F” grade.  Most likely such 
relatively long-distance moves are governed primarily by external factors such as spousal job 
changes or other significant family events, rather than a desire to change one’s work 
environment. Being shocked down to a failing grade does increase the likelihood that a teacher 
will exit the Florida public school system entirely. Although the exit effect is smaller, the 
evidence suggests that teachers are both more likely to switch schools and to give up on public 





In contrast to downward accountability shocks, receipt of a higher school grade or 
upward movement to an “A” grade does not have a statistically significant effect on either 
within-district teacher mobility or on the probability of remaining as a public school teacher, 
though the estimated effects on leaving teaching in the school district (or entirely) are on the 
margin of statistical significance at conventional levels.  Thus it appears that movements to the 
left tail of the school grade distribution have the greatest consequences for both the total supply 
of teachers and the distribution of teachers across schools. 
 
VI. Teacher Quality and Differential Mobility 
As numerous authors (e.g., Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain, 2005; Aaronson, Barrow and 
Sander, 2007) have demonstrated, there exists dramatic within-school variation in the level of 
teacher quality.  The degree to which teacher mobility engendered by accountability pressures 
affects the level and distribution of teacher quality across schools depends critically on which 
teachers within a school stay or go.  If relatively high-quality teachers depart schools facing 
accountability pressure this could mitigate any direct benefits to student learning brought about 
by the accountability system.  In contrast, if increased pressure leads to (either voluntary or 
involuntary) exit of the least capable teachers this could reinforce the direct positive effects of 
accountability pressure.
11 
While teacher quality is multidimensional, for the purposes of this paper we simply 
define teacher quality in terms of a teacher’s individual contribution to her student’s test scores.  
This is possible in the state of Florida because of the ability to link individual teachers to the 
                                                 
11 For analyses of the effects of teacher mobility on teacher quality in non-accountability 





students for whom they are responsible on a classroom basis.  Specifically, we estimate a so-
called “restricted value-added” model of student achievement of the following form:
12 
it kt mt kt ijmt it it A           S β T β P β Z β 4 3 2 1  (8) 
The gain in student achievement, Ait is a function of student/family inputs (Z), classroom-level 
peer characteristics (P), a vector of teacher experience indicators (T),
13 school-level inputs (S) 
and a year-specific teacher effect, .   The subscripts denote students (i), classrooms (j), teachers 
(k), schools (m) and time (t).
14  The model is estimated for both math achievement and for 
reading achievement in all grades 3-10 over the period 1999/2000 – 2004/05.
15  Only students 
with a single teacher in the relevant subject area are included in the analysis.  
The estimated value of the year-specific teacher effect, kt, is our measure of teacher 
quality.  The teacher-by-year estimates are re-centered to have a mean value of zero in each 
school level (elementary, middle, high) within each year.  The estimates represent the average 
achievement gain of a teacher’s students, for all classes taught in the relevant subject in a year, 
controlling for student, peer and school characteristics as well as for teacher experience.  Student 
achievement is measured by year-to-year gains in the normalized-by-grade-and-year FCAT-NRT 
                                                 
12 We also produced teacher quality estimates from two alternative models:  an “unrestricted” 
value-added model whereby current achievement is regressed on lagged achievement and the 
same set of controls as in equation (8) and a “restricted” value-added model like (8) in which 
student fixed effects were used to control for student heterogeneity.  We obtain very similar 
results for the relationship between accountability pressure and teacher quality using these 
alternative specifications.  Results using these alternative value-added specifications are 
available from the authors. 
13 We control for teacher experience, but not other teacher characteristics, because we are 
interested in identifying measured teacher quality for a given level of experience.  We have also 
estimated models in which teacher experience levels are excluded, and the results are 
fundamentally similar to those reported herein. 
14 For a derivation of the value-added model and its implicit assumptions, see Todd and Wolpin 
(2003). 






score.  Thus the teacher effects are calibrated in standard deviation units. Since there are no 
school-level fixed effects in the calculation of teacher effects, our year-specific teacher effect can 
be interpreted as the effectiveness of a given teacher relative to all other teachers teaching the 
same subject with the same level of experience at the same type of school.
16  The teacher quality 
measure can only be constructed for teachers who are responsible for teaching courses in the 
subjects and grades covered by achievement testing, reading and math.  In the following 
discussion we focus on the quality and mobility of math teachers.  Results for reading teachers 
are very similar, and are available on request from the authors.  
Table 6 reports the average teacher value added for stayers versus leavers in schools that 
were negatively shocked, those that were positively shocked, and those that were un-shocked 
when the accountability system changed.  It appears that in the case of positively shocked and 
un-shocked schools, the average quality of teachers did not change following the change in 
school accountability.  However, in the case of negatively shocked schools, the average teacher 
quality of leavers and stayers both improved after the shock.  While the average quality of 
teachers who depart improved more that the average teacher quality of stayers the difference in 
the quality of leavers and stayers as a result of downward accountability shocks is not 
statistically significant.  
In addition to comparing stayers and leavers within a given type of school, we also 
compare the average quality of leavers between accountability-shocked schools and unshocked 
schools in Table 7.  The sample size is smaller than in Table 3 since some teachers are teaching 
in non-tested subjects or grade levels or can’t be reliably matched to the performance of their 
students.  As a consequence, results must be interpreted with some caution. For schools 
                                                 






experiencing either no shock or an upward shock, the average quality of leavers does not change 
significantly over time.  In contrast, teachers who departed upwardly shocked schools were of 
significantly higher measured quality than those who left downwardly shocked schools before 
the accountability change.  As a result, the difference between the quality of teachers who leave 
downwardly shocked schools and those who depart no-shock schools increased over time.  Thus 
unexpected worsening of a schools grade lead to increases in both the number of teachers 
departing and the average quality of teachers who leave, relative to schools that did not 
experience a change in their school’s grade. 
In Table 8 we make a similar comparison between the quality of stayers in shocked and 
un-shocked schools.  The average quality of stayers improved in downward shocked schools by 
about 0.05 standard deviations in student achievement while there was no significant change in 
the quality of teacher who stay in un-shocked schools.  This is consistent with the findings of 
Rouse et al. (2007), suggesting that downward-shocked schools experience larger test score gains 
the year after the accountability shock.  The apparent increase in stayer quality could be due to 
positive effects of accountability (either increased resources like reading coaches or increased 
pressure to perform) that improve teacher quality.   
Table 9 demonstrates that the effects of downward accountability shocks on the quality of 
teachers who stay and leave essentially balance out.  Unexpected declines in a school’s grade 
lead to higher quality teachers departing but also lead to improvements in the quality of teachers 
who stay.  The net result is that the difference between the quality of stayers and leavers in 
downward-shock schools and the difference between the quality of stayers and leavers in no-





positive and negative effects on average teacher quality and that schools receiving unexpected 
decreases in school grades do not lose ground on the teacher quality margin. 
 The mean changes in teacher value added might mask changes in the distribution of 
movers and stayers. In order to understand the impact of accountability pressure on the 
distribution of teacher quality, we plot kernel density estimates of the distribution of teacher 
quality.  Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of mathematics teacher quality before and after the 
accountability shock by move status for schools that received no change in accountability and for 
schools that experience increased pressure (downward shock) as a result of the change in the 
school grading system.  In zero-shock schools there is little difference in the quality distributions 
of leavers and stayers, but the quality distribution of leavers shrinks after the accountability 
system change.  Un-shocked schools experience fewer instances of teachers leaving at both ends 
of the quality spectrum. In schools with increased accountability pressure there are more 
pronounced differences in the quality distributions of teachers who stay and those that leave.  
Prior to the accountability system change, the quality distribution of movers is to the left of the 
stayer distribution and the right tail of the stayer quality distribution is longer.  Following the 
accountability change, the right tail of the quality distribution of teachers staying in negatively-
shocked schools is truncated to become nearly equal to the right tail of the leaver quality 
distribution.  Further, the quality distribution of leavers shifts to the right while the distribution 
of stayers remains relatively constant over time. 
  
VII. Conclusion 
  This paper provides new evidence of the effects of school accountability systems on 





accountability system within a state, and therefore had no natural counterfactual, this study is the 
first to exploit policy variation within the same state to study the effects of accountability on 
teacher job changes. 
Taking advantage of exogenous changes in accountability pressure for schools, we find 
that schools that are downward-shocked – receiving a lower accountability grade post-change 
than would have happened before – are less likely to retain their teachers than are schools that 
received no accountability shock.  While downward-shocked schools in general lose more 
teachers, the effects are strongest for those shocked downward to a grade of "F".  Teachers in 
schools who unexpectedly receive a grade of "F" are over 40 percent more likely to leave their 
school and are nearly 70 percent more likely to move to another school in the same district than 
are teachers in schools that did not receive an accountability shock.  We also find some evidence 
the upward-shock schools are better able to retain their teachers than no-shock schools, though 
the measured effects are smaller and less precise than for downward-shock schools. 
The mobility caused by school accountability also has significant effects on the 
distribution of teacher quality within and across schools.  We find that downward accountability 
shocks lead to an increase in the quality of teachers who leave.  However, increased 
accountability pressure also leads to improvements in the quality of teachers who remain in 
downwardly shocked schools.  In contrast, schools that are not hit with an accountability shock 
do not experience any significant change to the quality of teachers that leave or stay.  While the 
quality differential between stayers and leavers does not change as a result of increased 
accountability pressure, we do find that downward shocked schools experience changes to the 
distribution of the quality of their teachers.  The upper tail of the quality distribution of teachers 





pressure.  Further, the quality distribution of teachers who move shifts to the right while the 
distribution of those who stay remains relatively constant.  It may be the case that the distribution 
of teachers staying or leaving schools shocked to "F" grades may be different, but we are hesitant 
to make those comparisons given the relatively small number of "F" school teachers for whom 
we have data to conduct the teacher quality analysis. 
    The results have strong implications for public policy.  Struggling schools that come 
under increased accountability pressure face many challenges in terms of changing instructional 
policies and practices to facilitate student improvement.  We have discovered that (in the case of 
those facing the highest accountability pressure) they also face the challenge of having to replace 
more teachers, and particularly, their higher-quality teachers (measured in terms of contribution 
to value-added).  On the positive side, schools facing increased accountability pressure also see a 
rise in the average quality of the teachers who stay.  It may be that those who stay respond work 
harder as a result of increased accountability pressure or they may appear to be more productive 
as a result of increases in complementary inputs like reading coaches.  The findings presented in 
this paper suggest that if these schools were able to retain more of their high-quality teachers 
(perhaps through increased incentives to remain in the school), the accountability gains could be 
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Table 1:  The Distribution of School Grades, by Year 
 
 















A  183 552 570 887  1235  1203 
B  299 255 399 549 565 515 
C  1180 1115 1074  723  533  568 
D  565 363 287 180 135 170 
F  70  4  0  60 31 34 
N  0 0  76  102  2 0 
Total  2297 2289 2330 2501 2501 2490 
 
 





Table 2:  Transition Matrix in Predicted Grades Based on 2002 Grade Change 
 (row fractions) 
 
    Grade in 2002 based on new (summer 2002) grading system 
    A B C D F 
Simulated 
grade in 2002 
























































Notes: All row fractions are student-weighted.  The number of schools is in brackets.  Simulated grade 
changes are generated by applying both the old grading system and the new grading system to 2002 
student test scores, using the approach introduced by Rouse et al. (2007).  They are therefore generated 
based on precisely the same student tests; the only differences in the calculations are the formulas used to 





Table 3: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the 
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  (0.003) 























Difference at a 









     (0.005)** 
 
Note: Authors’ calculations from state data. The fraction of teachers who left school is listed for each 
group. Standard errors clustered at the school-by-year level are given in the parentheses; sample sizes are 





Table 4: Logit/Conditional Logit Estimates of the Effect of  Accountability Shocks in 
Summer 2002 on the Odds of Teacher Job Change Between the 2002-03 and 2003-04 School Years 
 
 
Logit Conditional  Logit 
 






















































Effect of being 
downward 
shocked to grade F 




Effect of being 
upward shocked to 
grade A 







effect (logit) or 
school fixed effect  
(conditional logit) 
                           
District-level 
demographics                           
School-level 
demographics                        
School-level 
FCAT math score                    
School-level math 
score gains                   
Number of teacher 
year observations  456,342 456,342 438,245 438,071 384,637 384,598 384,598 
 
Note: The parameter estimates presented above are expressed in terms of odds ratios relative to the un-
shocked set of teachers. Standard errors clustered at the school-by-year level are in parentheses beneath 
parameter estimates. The dependent variable for the logit models is the probability that a teacher will 
leave a school between year t and t+1. The logit models also include indicators for year, the post-shock 





district characteristics such as percent of minority students (Black, Hispanic), percent of students on free 
or reduced lunch program, average math score on the Sunshine Standards FCAT, disciplinary incidents, 
and school-level math FCAT raw score gains.  The dependent variable for conditional logit models are 
the probability that a teacher will leave a school within the school district between year t and t+1.  In the 
conditional logit model school fixed effects replace the shock level fixed effects in logit model.  





Table 5: Conditional Logit by Transition Destination Estimates of 
the Effect of Accountability Shocks in Summer 2002 on the Odds of 
Teacher Job Change Between the 2002-03 and 2003-04 School Years 
 







Effect of downward accountability shock 










Effect of upward accountability shock 






























Year and post-shock indicators, school fixed effects             
District-level demographics             
School-level demographics             
School-level FCAT math score             
School-level math score gains             
Number of teacher-year observations 379,928  338,293 384,090 
 
Note: The parameter estimates presented above are expressed in terms of odds ratios relative to the un-
shocked set of teachers. Standard errors clustered at the school-by-year level are in parentheses beneath 
parameter estimates. Conditional logit by transition destination models the probability of moving to a new 
school, moving to a new district, and exiting Florida public schools separately between year t and t+1. 
The number of observations may differ across these transition outcomes depending on the number of 
dropped teacher/year observation due to all positive or negative outcomes. The conditional logit models 
also include year indicators, post-shock indicators, school fixed effects, school and district characteristics 
such as percent of minority students (Black, Hispanic), percent of students on free or reduced lunch 
program, average math score on the Sunshine Standards FCAT, disciplinary incidents, and school-level 





Table 6: Average Math Teacher Quality Differences for Stayers and Leavers 
across Zero-, Downward-, and Upward Shock Schools -- Before and After Policy Shock 
 




Time Difference for 
School Type 
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Note: The teacher quality measure used here is obtained through a value-added specification with 
student’s gain scores as the dependent variable. Other right hand side parameters are student 
covariates (gender, race/ethnicity, free/reduced-price lunch eligibility, gifted program 
participation, limited English proficiency, disability status, moibility), classroom peer 
characteristics (gender, race mobility, age, class size) and school-level covariates (new school 
indicator, experience of principal, indicator for new principal at school); p<0.001***, p<0.01**, 





Table 7: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Impact of Accountability Shock on the 
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Note: for definition of teacher quality measure, see note to Table 6; p<0.001***, p<0.01**, 














Table 8: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Impact of Accountability Shock on the 
































Difference at a 
































Difference at a 
point in time 
-0.015 
    (0.007)* 
0.034 





       (0.011)*** 
 
Note: for definition of teacher quality measure, see note to Table 6; p<0.001***, p<0.01**, 
p<0.05*. #statistically significant at 10% level. 
 





Table 9: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Impact of Accountability Shock on the 
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Note: for definition of teacher quality measure, see note to Table 6; p<0.001***, p<0.01**, 






Figure 1:  Kernel Density Estimates of Teacher Quality Distribution by School Type 
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